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In November it was revealed that the British authorities had also been in talks with the IRA.
On Wednesday 15 December 1993 the Joint Declaration on Peace (more commonly known as The Downing Street Declaration) was issued by John Major, then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and Albert Reynolds, then TaoiseachThe Taoiseach (plural: Taoisigh or, more formally, An Taoiseach is the head of government or prime minister of the Republic of Ireland and the leader of the Irish cabinet1. The Taoiseach is appointed by the President upon the nomination of Dail Eireann (t (Irish Prime MinisterAlternate meaning: Prime Minister (band #A prime minister is the leading member of the cabinet of the top level government in a parliamentary system of government of a country, alternatively #A prime minister is an official in a presidential system or sem), on behalf of the British and Irish Governments. This included statements that:
On Wednesday 31 August 1994 the IRA announced a "Cessation of Military Operations" from midnight. Albert Reynolds, the Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister), said that he accepted the IRA statement as implying a permanent ceasefire. Unionists were sceptical.
In the following period there were disputes about the permanence of the ceasefire, whether parties linked to paramilitaries should be included in talks, and the rate of "normalisation" in Northern Ireland. Loyalist bombings and shootings, and punishment beatings from both sides, continued. The IRA denied responsibility for further bombings.
There now follows an abbreviated list of events of significance in the lead-up to all-party negotiations:
The agreement, which included a devolved, inclusive government, prisoner release, troop reductions, targets for paramilitary decommissioning, provisions for polls on Irish Unification, and civil rights measures and parity of esteem for the two communities in Northern Ireland is the subject of a separate article.
The agreement was to be approved by a referendum in Northern Ireland, and a separate referendum was to be held in the Irish Republic to approve the necessary change to Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution. The people of the Irish Republic overwhelmingly endorsed the agreement, but the campaign in Northern Ireland was more controversial, and the result less predictable.
The pro-agreement campaign framed the question as progress versus stalemate, as a struggle between intolerant bigots with no solutions on the one hand, and moderates with a constructive way forward on the other. The agreement was promoted to the Nationalist community as delivering civil rights, inclusive government, recognition of their Irishness, and a peaceful route to Irish Unification. To the Unionist community, it was presented as bringing an end to the troubles, a guaranteed end to paramilitaries and their weapons, and a guarantee of the Union for the foreseeable future.
On the Republican side, the "No" campaign seemed to concentrate on the purity of the republican ideal of complete and absolute independence from Britain. In this view any compromise, however temporary, on the goal of Irish unity (or the right to wage the armed struggle) was depicted as a betrayal of those who had fought and died for Ireland. Decommissioning of weapons and an end to paramilitary activity was portrayed as surrender to the British. The principle of consent was represented as a "Unionist Veto". It was pointed out that the agreement accepted partition. The state and its institutions would remain hostile to the Republican community, claimed the critics.
On the Unionist side, the "No" campaign stressed what were represented as concessions to republicanism and terrorism, particularly the release of convicted terrorists (often those who had murdered friends and relatives), the presence of terrorists (in the guise of Sinn Féin) in government, the lack of guarantees on decommissioning, the one-way nature of the process for moving to a United Ireland, the lack of trust in all those who would be implementing the agreement, and the erosion of the British identity.
It was widely expected that the Nationalist community would endorse the agreement. As the vote approached, Unionist opinion appeared divided into those who supported the agreement, those who opposed the agreement on principle, and those who welcomed agreement, but still had major misgivings about aspects like prisoner release and the role of paramilitaries. The fear among the Agreement's supporters was that there would not be a majority (or only a slim majority) of the unionist community in favour of the agreement, and that its credibility would be fatally undermined.
In the Irish Republic, the results of the vote to change the constitution in line with the agreement were:
| Electorate: | 2,753,127 |
| Turnout: | 1,545,395 (56%) |
| Valid votes: | 1,528,331 |
| Votes in favour: | 1,442,583 (94.4%) |
| Votes against: | 85,748 (5.6%) |
| Spoiled votes: | 17,064 |
In Northern Ireland, the results of the vote on the agreement were:
| Electorate: | 1,175,403 |
| Turnout: | 953,583 (81%) |
| Valid votes: | 951,845 |
| Votes in favour: | 676,966 (71.1%) |
| Votes against: | 274,879 (28.9%) |
| Spoiled votes | 1,738 |
There is no official breakdown of how the Nationalist and Unionist communities voted, but CAIN, the Conflict Archive on the Internet, estimated that the overwhelming majority (up to 97%) of Catholics and Nationalists in Northern Ireland voted 'Yes'. Their estimate of Protestant and Unionist support for the agreement was between 51 and 53 per cent.
Complicating matters for the calculation was the turnout, with a substantial increase over elections in many traditionally unionist areas, whilst the turnout was close to that for elections in staunch nationalist areas. Approximately 147,000 more people voted in the referendum than in the subsequent Assembly elections, though it is estimated that there was also some deliberate abstentions by republican voters.
The referendum was calculated centrally so it is not clear what the geographic spread of voting was, but an exit poll found that only North Antrim voted against the Agreement.
The pro-agreement result was greeted at the time with relief by supporters of the agreement. However, the scale of sceptical and anti-agreement sentiment in the unionist community, their continued misgivings over aspects of the agreement, and differing expectations from the Agreement on the part of the two communities were to cause difficulties in the following years.
- The Northern Ireland Assembly made a good start. However, it has since been suspended because of the IRA's failure to decommission their weapons. Elections have carried on nonetheless and voting has polarised towards the more radical parties - the DUP and Sinn Féin.
- Although the Royal Ulster Constabulary has now been replaced by the Police Service of Northern Ireland, the PSNI is still mistrusted by many Catholics and is not accepted by Sinn Féin.
- The whole peace process has been hung up on the lack of decommissioning by the IRA. No weapons were decommissioned until October 2001, and not all the IRA's weapons have yet been put beyond use.
- Many people feel that the early release of prisoners was simply to appease paramilitaries. It hurts especially the loved ones of victims of the prisoners being released.
- While killings and bombings have been almost eliminated, lower level violence and crime, including "punishment" beatings, extortion and drug dealing continue. Paramilitary organisations still have considerable control in some less affluent areas.
This REALLY needs work Ha
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