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The AUC claims its primary objective is to protect its sponsors from insurgents and their activities, including kidnapping and extortion, because the state historically failed to do so. The AUC now asserts itself as a regional and national counterinsurgent force. Former AUC supreme leader Carlos Castaño in 2000 claimed 70 percent of the AUC's operational costs were financed with drug-related earnings, the rest coming from "donations" from its sponsors.
The AUC's main enemies are leftist insurgency groups, the FARC and ELN, both of which are classified as foreign terrorist organizations by the US State Department. In 2001, the State Department condemned the AUC for massacres, torture, and other human rights abuses and added it to the terrorist group list.
According to the Colombian National Police in the first ten months of 2000 the AUC conducted 804 assassinations, 203 kidnappings, and 75 massacres with 507 victims. The AUC claims the victims were guerrillas or sympathizers. Combat tactics consist of conventional and guerrilla operations against main force insurgent units. AUC clashes with military and police units are increasing, although the group has traditionally avoided government security forces.
Some analysts and recent Human Rights Watch reports allege that numerous elements within the Colombian military and police still continue to either collaborate with or tolerate local AUC paramilitary groups.[1] A number of these analysts may concede that there has been a noticeable reduction in such behavior in recent years and that there have been increasing efforts to combat paramilitary influence, but most consider that much more remains to be done and thus they remain seriously critical of this situation.
Recently, after a cease-fire was declared (which in practice has been publicly admitted by the AUC and the government to be partial, resulting in a reduction but not the cessation of killings), the government of Colombian president Álvaro Uribe Vélez has begun talks with the group with the aim to eventually dismantle the organization and reintegrate its members to society. The stated deadline for completing the demobilization process would be December 2005. Several hundred members of the organization (more than 600) have already demobilized under existing laws.
A new law project was presented to the public which offered to pardon the members of any illegal armed group (which would legally include both guerrillas and paramilitaries) that declared a cease-fire and entered talks with the government, in return for, mainly, their verified demobilization, concentration within a specific geographic area and the symbolic reparation of the offenses committed against the victims of their actions. After much discussion and controversy over it, a further revised draft was distributed to the media and political circles. This new project has not yet been officially submitted for approval by the Colombian Congress as of October 2004.
The new project, among other details, called for the creation of a 3 to 5 member Truth Tribunal which would study each case brought before it (at the request of the President), after the groups/ individuals sign an agreement to respect international humanitarian laws and accept the authority of the Tribunal, in exchange for a minimum sentence of 5 to 10 years (part of it could possibly be served outside jail) for those guilty of the most serious crimes, the confession of the crimes which were committed in connection with the activities of the illegal armed group, and the completion of concrete acts of reparation towards the victims.
If the Tribunal were to deny the benefits to anyone, there would be no possibility of reconsideration. However, the President would be able to veto individuals who did receive a favorable sentence. The new law would be in effect only until 31st December of 2006.
HRW spokesman Jose Miguel Vivanco publicly stated, during one of the final audiences which were created to discuss aspects of the original project (of which he remained highly critical), that the new proposition seemed to be considerably more in line with international standards, at first glance.In contrast to these efforts, Salvatore Mancuso , one of the AUC's main commanders, has publicly expressed that he is against both any potential extradition of himself (and his "comrades in arms") towards the USA and refuses "spending any day in jail".
Also, there have been internal conflicts within the illegal organization, as other AUC leaders have mutually accused each other of being tainted with narcotrafficking and their troops have even met in combat. These different, regionalistic and sometimes warring factions within the AUC, make succesfully concluding any peace initiative a considerably difficult task.
In mid-May 2004, the talks appeared to move forward as the government agreed to grant the AUC leaders and 400 of their bodyguards a 142 square mile (368 km²) safe haven in Santa Fe de Ralito, Córdoba, where, under OASOAS is an acronym with different meanings: Organization of American States Organisation de l'Armee Secrete Option Adjusted Spread TLAs. verification, further discussions will be held, for a (renewable) trial period of 6 months. While the AUC leaders remain in this area, they will not be subject to arrest warrants. That condition and most of remaining legal framework invoked was previously implemented for the much larger San Vicente del Caguán area that former President Pastrana granted the FARC guerrillas during the 1998-2002 peace process, but there are differences.
The local, state and police authorities will not leave the zone, since Colombian laws will still be fully applicable within its limits. The paramilitary leaders will require special permission to leave and re-enter the zone, and government prosecutors will be allowed to operate inside it in order to investigate criminal offenses.